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The impact of institutional investors of the performance of 
companies listed at the PSE 
 
*Murad H. Harasheh and Monther Nijim 
 
                    Institutional investors have grown substantially in international, mature markets 
in last two decades parallel with the increase in their impact. They seek to own 
large proportions of equities; as a result they have become influential on the 
performance of companies in which they invest. Previous studies show no 
conclusive evidence on the direction in the role of institutional investors on 
performance. This research attempts to examine the impact of institutional 
investors' involvement on performance of investee companies. Performance 
was measured by using Tobin's q. The study was conducted using cross-
sectional regression analysis. And significant statistical relationships were found 
in this research. 
 
Field of research: Corporate governance  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Institutional investors can be defined as economic entities with large amount of 
capital to invest; they include mutual funds, brokerages, insurance companies, 
pension funds, investment banks and endowment funds. Their potential influence as 
large shareholders was traced back to 1930 in the separation of owners from control 
of business to be in the hand of directors when was first introduced by (Berle & 
Means, 1932). This separation of ownership was behind the agency problem, when 
managers (agents) might look for their own interest rather than on behalf the interest 
of shareholders. Over time the impact of institutional investors has been increasing, 
their shareholding in equities have grown dramatically since the middle of the 20th 
century, we can't underestimate their influential role on the macro & micro levels in 
the economy especially when we talk about foreign institutional investment in the 
form of portfolio investment in the equities of emerging financial markets. On the 
macro level as outlined in (Davis and Steil, 2001), the growth of institutional investors 
can be traced to various supply and demand factors that have made investing via 
institutions attractive to households. Literature has found no conclusive evidence 
about the impact of institutional investors. The increasing importance of the new 
market engines (institutional investors) makes it valuable to investigate their impact 
on corporate performance in the Palestinian listed companies. 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
2.1. Institutional investors and corporate performance 
 
Institutional investors as corporate monitors were a focus of many studies and 
researches. Many studies in that field hypothesized that there is a link between 
institutional investors & corporate governance in one side and corporate governance  
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& long-term corporate performance, but the findings appear to be fairly mixed. 
Subsequently, (Millstein and MacAvoy, 1998) found that corporations with active and 
independent boards appear to have performed much better in the 1990s than those 
with passive, non-independent boards in a study covered large US listed companies. 
Conversely, the work of (Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson, 1998) concluded that 
no such relation between board composition and firms' performance, and that there 
was no relationship between leadership structure (CEO/Chairman) and firm 
performance. Despite that evidence seems to appear quite mixed, there is a common 
perception that corporate governance can make a difference to the bottom line. A 
study by (McKinsey, 2002) found that investors are most likely willing to pay a 
premium to invest in a company with good corporate governance.  
 
(Gompers, Ishii & Metrick, 2003) investigated the ways in which shareholder rights 
vary across firms. They found that firms with stronger shareholder rights had higher 
firm value, higher profits, higher sales growth, lower capital expenditures, and made 
fewer corporate acquisitions. (Deutsche Bank, 2004) studied the impact of corporate 
governance on portfolio management and concluded that corporate governance 
standards are an important for equity risk. (Mallin & Runall, 2006) pointed that 
shareholders' activism is an important issue for deriving good corporate governance 
and without this there is less accountability and transparency, and hence 
management get more opportunities to work for their interest rather than owners' 
interest (value maximization). 
 
Some studies find that large institutional shareholdings in a firm prohibit managers 
from declaring pre-determined earnings through managing discretionary accrual 
choices. In addition, (Parrino, Sias, and Starks, 2003) show that institutional selling is 
associated with forced CEO turnover and that these CEOs are more likely to be 
replaced with an outsider, through effective voting against the dissatisfying CEO. In 
the same manner (Cornett, Marcus, Saunders and Terhranian, 2005), (Navissi & 
Naiker, 2006), found that there is a positive relation between institutional investor 
(pressure insensitive) involvement in a firm and its operating cash flow returns.  
2.2.  Institutional Investors and corporate governance 
Corporate governance has recently received much attention due to Adelphia, Enron, 
WorldCom, and other high profile scandals, serving as the impetus to such recent 
U.S. regulations as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, considered to be the most 
sweeping corporate governance regulation in the past 70 years, and enhancing the 
long standing bandwagon for increasing shareholder power, according to 
(Huyghebaert & Hulle, 2004), corporate governance concerns the development of 
performing top structures in corporate organization. One of the important dimensions 
of corporate governance is the creation of effective monitoring of managers, voting by 
shareholders is a legal exercise for monitoring and electing the board of directors, 
these directors are responsible for monitoring management. Recently many 
questions have been raised if institutional investors should be assigned to an 
influential role in corporate governance. 
 
During the past decades, institutional investors become increasingly important as 
shareholders. There are two views about institutional investors activism, the one is 
active monitoring. The opposite view is represented by the “passive monitoring” 
hypothesis. On the other hand, a study was conducted by (David and Kochhar, 
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1996), they argue that various institutional obstacles, such as barriers derived from 
business relationships, the regulatory environment and information processing 
limitations, may interrupt institutional investors from exercising their corporate 
governance role. (Leech, 2000) argues that many institutional shareholders do not 
seek control over companies in which they invest for many reasons, which include 
the fear of obtaining price sensitive information, so institutional investors are more 
likely to influence rather than complete control.  
 
Almost no literature was written about the size and impact of institutional investors in 
Palestine due to the newly established securities market and the new trend in 
institutional investment especially the foreign one. Very few studies were conducted 
concerning corporate governance at the PSE, one of them was conducted by 
(Abdelkarim & Alawneh, 2007), this study relates corporate governance and 
performance for companies listed at the PSE by considering ownership concentration 
as one of governance dimensions, they found that financial performance is negatively 
correlated to ownership concentration that weakens the corporate governance and 
market efficiency at all, they reported that Palestinian listed companies have 
ownership concentration that affects information disclosure and transparency that 
have an inverse impact on governance.    
Based on the literature, this paper attempts to answer the following questions, 
1- Does the involvement by institutional investors have an impact on corporate 
financial performance? 
2- Is there a difference between the involvement of whole number of institutional                
investors and board member institutional investors? 
Based on the mentioned questions, this paper will focuses on a set of variables that 
will be tested thorough empirical testing using regression analysis. The following 
hypotheses explain the idea more clearly. 
H0: There is statistically insignificant relationship between number of institutional     
investors and the corporate performance measured by Tobin's q. 
H1:  There is statistically significant relationship between number of institutional 
investors and the corporate performance measured by Tobin's q. 
 
3. Methodology and Research Design 
 
In order to test the above mentioned hypotheses, the following regression model was 
developed to fit the Palestinian context to assess the impact of institutional investors 
on corporate value for Palestinian companies listed at the Palestine Securities 
Exchange (PSE). 
Q = α + β1debt + β2NIG + β3IR + β4NII + е 
Where  α is the vertical intercept, β is the regression coefficients and e is the error 
term.  
Debt: is measured as (total debt / total assets). It is a measure of firm's 
indebtedness, the proportion of the investments financed by debt, finance literature 
revealed that this variable have some impact on firm's value. we can note here that 
debt variable in this study is taken as total liabilities over total assets, because almost 
no long-term debt used by Palestinian companies.  
NIG:  Net Income Growth = (NIt – NIt-1) / NIt-1 is the growth in net income after tax 
between the two years. 
IR:   Institutional investors represented on the board of the investee company. 
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NII: The whole number of institutional investors holding a particular stock in a specific 
year. 
Dependent variable: Tobin's Q: is one of the popular measures of corporate 
financial performance, Q = market value of firm / corporate net worth 
The sample for the regression model was 18 selected PSE listed companies based 
on the availability of data during the period of the study, because the PSE contains 
37 listed companies, but most of them have been recently listed and have no public 
data for these years. A cross-sectional regression analysis was used for three 
consecutive years 2005, 2006, 2007 & 2008 as the majority of companies were listed 
in the last four years  to asses the impact of the existence of institutional investors on 
corporate financial performance measured by Tobin;s q.  
 
4. Discussion of Findings 
 
In this part, the results of the empirical studies will be discussed and analyzed in 
relationship to paper hypotheses mentioned earlier. This part will discuss two main 
ideas; the first is the size of institutional investors in the Palestine Securities 
Exchange, and the second attempts to answer the question regarding the 
relationship between institutional investors and corporate performance. 
 
First: that deals with the size of institutional investors in Palestinian market; As of 
April 27, 2008, the total percentage holding by institutional investors in Palestinian 
listed companies reached 53 % which represents 1,639.6 millions USD, which can be 
classified into local institutional investors account for 20.4 % of total market 
capitalization in that date which represents 630 millions USD, and foreign institutional 
investors with a total percentage holding reached 32.6 % of total market capitalization 
that represents 1,063.6 millions USD. 
 
Second: this part tries to answer if there is a relationship between institutional 
investors and corporate performance. The measures of institutional investor 
ownership follow those used in (Hartzell and Starks, 2003). I find the total number of 
institutional investors holding a particular stock and the other is the number of 
institutional investors represented on Investee company's board for three consecutive 
years 2005, 2006, and 2007. I estimate a multivariate regression in which Tobin's q in 
each year is a function of various corporate variables. My particular focus is the 
impact of the number of institutional investors on performance. I run a regression for 
the three years 2005, 2006 & 2007 separately for 18 companies in each year. 
Consistent and significant findings were found in 2005 & 2006 about the relationship 
between the number of institutional investors and performance. 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics  
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
M/B .48 2.87 1.4134 .67122 
Debt .0 77.0 29.967 21.6167 
NII 4 153 42.17 46.795 
NIG -770 1212 53.83 423.570 
IR 0 13 6.28 3.982 
 
The above table represents a descriptive statistics. 18 observations for each variable. 
The market to book value variable ranges from 0.48 to 2.87 times, debt varies from 0 
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to 77% with 22 standard deviation, which means there is a variety in the use of debt 
by firms in Palestine. A large deviation can be noticed in the net income growth 
variable which ranges from -770% to 1212% with 423% standard deviation which 
indicates that there is no earning stability for Palestinian firms due to the political and 
economic instability. Number of institutional investors variable ranges from 4 to 153 
with 47 standard deviation, which means that Palestinian firms vary in there 
ownership structure regarding the involvement of institutional investors. The last one 
is the number of institutionals represented on board of investee companies, which 
varies from 0 to 13, from no institutional representation to full representation on 
board.  
 
Table 2: Summary of regression results 
    Regression NII IR NIG Debt 
Adjusted R
2
 0.413         
Sig 0.025 0.002 0.083 0.927 0.813 
2
0
0
5
 
Β   0.03 -0.157 0 0.003 
Adjusted R
2
 0.63         
Sig 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.008 0.501 
2
0
0
6
 
Β   0.009 -0.115 -0.001 -0.003 
Adjusted R
2
 0.201         
Sig 0.144 0.263 0.105 0.686 0.054 
2
0
0
7
 
Β   0.005 -0.084 0 0.016 
Adjusted R
2
 0.38         
Sig 0.188 0.047 0.005 0.374 0.723 
2
0
0
8
 
Β   0.005 -0.057 0 -0.002 
 
2005 Analysis: looking at the coefficients which shows the importance of each 
independent variable in the explaining the changes in the dependent variable. The 
most important influential exploratory variable is the whole number of institutional 
investors, we can see a positive significant relationship between the whole number of 
institutional invertors holding a particular stock and market to book value as a 
measure of performance, the regression coefficient is 0.03 and 0.002 significance. 
These results shows the importance of the number of institutional investors holding 
the stock, and it is enforced by the negative but insignificant relationship between the 
number of institutional investors represented on board and firm's performance, so it is 
important to have a large number of institutional investors with diluted ownership (to 
prevent the concentration of ownership) to positively affect firm's performance. These 
results can be explained in light of the concentration of ownership, when the 
representation on board by institutionals increase, this would be at the expense of the 
whole number of institutional investors, making few institutional investors control the 
board and they may need to be monitored by other party. These results reveal that 
most of Palestinian listed companies are controlled by little number of members who 
are representatives for institutional investors, that they become not caring about 
monitoring management and board. As a result we accept the alternate hypothesis 
as long as the regression is significant at 0.05 significance level. 
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Table 3: Correlations matrix 2005 
  M/B NII NIG REP Debt 
Pearson Correlation 1 .651(**) -.133 -.073 .018 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .003 .599 .775 .944 
M/B 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson Correlation .651(**) 1 -.132 .389 -.046 
Sig. (2-tailed) .003 . .600 .110 .856 
NII 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson Correlation -.133 -.132 1 .047 .191 
Sig. (2-tailed) .599 .600 . .852 .447 
NIG 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson Correlation -.073 .389 .047 1 -.033 
Sig. (2-tailed) .775 .110 .852 . .897 
REP 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson Correlation .018 -.046 .191 -.033 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .944 .856 .447 .897 . 
Debt 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 4: Model Summary 2005 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .742(a) .551 .413 1.22689 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Net income growth, Number of institutionals 
 
Table 5: ANOVA(b) 
Model  Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 24.022 4 6.005 3.990 .025(a) 
Residual 19.568 13 1.505   
1 
Total 43.590 17    
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Net income growth, # of institutionals 
b  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
 
Table 6: Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model  B Std. Error Beta T Sig. 
(Constant) 1.949 .688  2.834 .014 
NIG .000 .000 -.018 -.093 .927 
NII .030 .008 .799 3.908 .002 
Debt .003 .013 .046 .242 .813 
1 
REP -.157 .084 -.381 -1.878 .083 
a  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
 
2006 Analysis: From the coefficients' table we can see that there are three 
significant relationships between dependent and independent variables, the first 
significant one is the positive relationship between the number of institutional 
investors and the firm's performance with 0.009 regression coefficient and 0.001 
significance, the second is negative significant relationship between net income 
growth and firm's performance with -0.001 regression coefficient and 0.008 
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significance, the third one is the negative significant relationship between the number 
of institutional investors on board and performance with -0.115 coefficient and 0.001 
significance. These results can be explained in light of the weak efficiency of the 
Palestine Securities Exchange. Its important to have a large number of institutional 
investors, but still there is a lack of knowledge among various investors about the 
good impact of earning growth and the market does not distinguish between growing 
and non-growing companies. Hence we accept the alternate hypothesis. And the 
relationship can be expressed as follows. 
 
Q = 1.904 - 0.001NIG - 0.115IR + 0.009NII  
 
In addition, increasing the number of institutional investors will improve the 
governance practices and hence will have a positive impact on corporate value by 
decreasing the conflict that may arise between small and large institutional investors. 
Increasing the number of institutionals at the expense of the percentage holding (de-
concentration of ownership) will have a liquidity effect by buying and selling shares 
when they believe that the stock is under or over-valued enhancing the stock to be 
traded on its fair value. The results of 2006 regression seem to be consistent with 
other studies making this study to add a value to the literature about the field of 
institutional investors and corporate performance.  
 
Table 7: ANOVA(b) 
Model  Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 5.484 4 1.371 8.194 .002(a) 
 Residual 2.175 13 .167   
 Total 7.659 17    
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Number of institutionals, Net income growth 
b  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
 
Table 8: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .846(a) .716 .629 .40904 
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Table 9: Correlation Matrix 2006 
  M/B NII NIG REP Debt 
M/B Pearson Correlation 
1 .514(*) -.345 -.329 .044 
 Sig. (2-tailed) . .029 .161 .182 .862 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
NII Pearson Correlation .514(*) 1 -.185 .277 .112 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .029 . .462 .267 .657 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
NIG Pearson Correlation -.345 -.185 1 -.372 -.227 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .161 .462 . .129 .366 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
REP Pearson Correlation -.329 .277 -.372 1 .052 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .182 .267 .129 . .838 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
Debt Pearson Correlation .044 .112 -.227 .052 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .862 .657 .366 .838 . 
 N 18 18 18 18 18 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 10: Coefficients(a) 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model  B Std. Error Beta T Sig. 
(Constant) 1.904 .253  7.523 .000 
NIG -.001 .000 -.508 -3.104 .008 
NII .009 .002 .622 4.010 .001 
Debt -.003 .005 -.105 -.692 .501 
1 
REP -.115 .028 -.685 -4.182 .001 
 
2007 analysis: the regression results do not support the exploratory power; the 
overall regression was insignificant at 5% significance level.  
 
Table 11: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .624(a) .389 .201 .74003 
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Number of institutionals, Net income growth 
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Table 12: Correlation Matrix 2007 
  M/B NII NIG REP Debt 
Pearson Correlation 1 .115 -.085 -.338 .466 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .650 .736 .170 .051 
M/B 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson Correlation .115 1 -.189 .323 -.020 
Sig. (2-tailed) .650 . .453 .191 .939 
NII 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson Correlation -.085 -.189 1 -.120 -.364 
Sig. (2-tailed) .736 .453 . .636 .137 
NIG 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson Correlation -.338 .323 -.120 1 -.029 
Sig. (2-tailed) .170 .191 .636 . .910 
REP 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
Pearson Correlation .466 -.020 -.364 -.029 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .051 .939 .137 .910 . 
Debt 
N 18 18 18 18 18 
 
Table 13: ANOVA(b) 
Model  Sum of Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 4.529 4 1.132 2.068 .144(a) 
 Residual 7.119 13 .548   
 Total 11.649 17    
a  Predictors: (Constant), Representation on board, Debt, Number of institutionals, Net income growth 
b  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
 
Table 14: Coefficients(a) 
Model  Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients T Sig. 
  B Std. Error Beta   
1 (Constant) 1.019 .471  2.167 .049 
 NIG .000 .000 .099 .413 .686 
 NII .005 .004 .272 1.170 .263 
 Debt .016 .008 .495 2.115 .054 
 REP -.084 .048 -.400 -1.741 .105 
a  Dependent Variable: Market to Book 
  
2008 analysis: only 17 companies out of 18 were regretted, and one company was 
excluded due to the insufficient data and became unlisted company during the year 
2008. 
 
Table 15: Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square Std. Error of the Estimate 
1 .616(a) .379 .172 .400797 
a  Predictors: (Constant), NIG, NI, Debt, REP 
 
Almost weak exploratory power for the whole regression for the year 2008 as 
indicated in R2 = 61% and adjusted R2 = 38%, and as shown in the table below the 
whole regression is almost insignificant as the standard error is greater than 5%. 
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Table 16: ANOVA 
Model   Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Regression 1.177 4 .294 1.831 .188(a) 
Residual 1.928 12 .161     
1 
Total 3.104 16       
a  Predictors: (Constant), NIG, NI, Debt, REP 
b  Dependent Variable: Q 
 
Table 17: Coefficients 
Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
Model   B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
(Constant) 1.020 .248   4.108 .001 
Debt -.002 .005 -.084 -.363 .723 
NII .005 .002 .530 2.215 .047 
REP -.057 .027 -.559 -2.146 .0501 
1 
NIG .000 .000 -.232 -.924 .374 
a  Dependent Variable: Q 
 
The tables of coefficients shows that only the whole number of institutional investors 
and the institutional investors represented on board are significant with 0.005 
regression coefficients for NII and -0.057 for the IR, but the whole regression is 
insignificant in explaining the performance of the companies as measured by M/B 
Here we can say that the direction of impact for each variable is consistent for all 
years of study.  
  
Table 18: Correlations 
    M/B Debt NII REP NIG 
Pearson Correlation 1 .012 .375 -.327 .006 
Sig. (2-tailed) . .963 .139 .200 .982 
M/B 
N 17 17 17 17 17 
Pearson Correlation .012 1 .084 -.121 .072 
Sig. (2-tailed) .963 . .747 .643 .784 
Debt 
N 17 17 17 17 17 
Pearson Correlation .375 .084 1 .247 .045 
Sig. (2-tailed) .139 .747 . .339 .864 
NII 
N 17 17 17 17 17 
Pearson Correlation -.327 -.121 .247 1 -.393 
Sig. (2-tailed) .200 .643 .339 . .118 
REP 
N 17 17 17 17 17 
Pearson Correlation .006 .072 .045 -.393 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .982 .784 .864 .118 . 
NIG 
N 17 17 17 17 17 
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5. Conclusion 
 
From the previous analysis, institutional investors are the majority owners of most 
corporations listed on Palestine Securities Exchange. The results presented in this 
paper show contradiction findings. In one hand, it revealed a significant positive 
relationship between the whole number of institutional investors and corporate 
performance measured by Tobin's q, this result was found in 2005, 2006 & 2008, but 
not in 2007. On the other hand, a significant negative relationship was found between 
the number of institutional investors represented on the board of investee companies 
and firms performance in 2006 & 2008 only. These results can be explained in light of 
some dimensions; liquidity & information asymmetries, ownership concentration, 
results show also that net income growth has a negative relationship to corporate 
performance. The results are somewhat consistent with other studies but are 
inconclusive findings, results for the number of institutional investors are consistent 
with existing evidence, and other variables' results are somewhat consistent or less 
consistent due the weak efficiency in the securities market in Palestine.  
 
It was found that there is an ownership concentration by some institutional investors 
in Palestine that may lead to a conflict of interest between large and small 
shareholders, it was found that one or two institutional investors control the board of 
investee companies, or it may increase its holding making the investee company a 
subsidiary or affiliate. And then "who watches who?" and "who watches the watchers"  
in which previous studies revealed that active institutional investors always do not set 
on boards. The inconclusive findings in this paper are not surprising, also in this field 
did not generate conclusive evidence about the true relationship between institutional 
investors and corporate performance, so further research is needed using other 
methodologies like time series analysis or considering more companies and years in 
the sample. Given the limited scope of the research in this topic, taking into 
consideration the weak efficiency of Palestine Securities Exchange & the lack of 
knowledge about institutional investors involvement, and small size of Palestine 
Securities Exchange that make it easy to be controlled by few number of large 
institutional investors.  
 
During conducting the research, many limitations were encountered. First of all, the 
lack of data about corporate governance in Palestine and the lack of data and 
literature about institutional investors & ownership structure in Palestine. The use of 
other measure of financial performance, other than Tobin's q may show different 
results. Another important limitation is that the lack of sufficient years that limits the 
use of time series analysis before & after the involvement of institutional investors, 
since that the PSE was established in 1997, and the majority of companies were 
listed in the last four years.   
 
6. Recommendations 
 
• Give more attention to the large institutional holding, since that there is a 
positive relationship between the whole number of institutional investors and 
corporate performance. And a negative one between institutionals represented 
on board and performance. 
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• The Capital Market Authority and Palestine Securities Exchange should set 
regulations that prevent a percentage holding of share in investee companies 
to protect the control by few institutional investors.  
• To have better monitoring by large institutional investors, they should not set 
on board of investee companies in order to have wider bird's view image. 
• It is important to work on knowledge and informative programs about the good 
impact of the large number of institutional investors and the bad impact of few 
large institutional investors who controls boards of investee company, 
enhancing low governance practices.  
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